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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes both economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes
towards immigrants, within and across countries. The two individual-level survey data sets
used, covering a wide range of developed and developing countries, make it possible to test for
interactive eﬀects between individual characteristics and country-level attributes. In particular,
trade and labor-economics theories of labor markets predict that the correlation between pro-
immigration attitudes and individual skill should be related to the skill composition of natives
relative to immigrants in the destination country. Skilled individuals should favor immigration
in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants and oppose it in the other countries.
Results based on both direct and indirect measures of the relative skill composition of natives to
immigrants are consistent with these predictions. Individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes
are positively correlated in countries where the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants
is high. Individuals with higher levels of skill are more likely to be pro-immigration in high per
capita GDP countries and less likely in low per capita GDP countries. Non-economic variables
also appear to be correlated with immigration attitudes but they don’t seem to alter signiﬁcantly
t h er e s u l t so nt h ee c o n o m i ce x p l a n a t i o n s .
JEL classiﬁcation: F22, F1, J61.
Keywords: Immigration Attitudes, International Migration, Political Economy.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Are attitudes towards foreigners inﬂuenced by economic considerations or are they driven exclu-
sively by non-economic issues? Do individuals feel threatened by the labor-market competition
of foreigners? Are people concerned about security and cultural issues? More generally, who is
against immigration, why, and in which countries?
I address these questions by empirically analyzing attitudes towards immigrants within and
across countries, using two individual-level survey data sets.1 I investigate both economic and non-
economic explanations of preference formation and relate the results on the economic determinants
to standard trade and labor-economics theories of immigration.
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1Iw i l lu s et h et e r m sattitudes and preferences interchangeably in the text.
1Among the economic determinants, the main focus of this paper is on labor-market ones. Stan-
dard trade and labor-economics theories of labor markets, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model and
the factor-proportions-analysis model, predict that immigration attitudes depend on the impact on
factor prices of changes in relative factor supplies due to immigration. If factor-price-insensitivity
holds, immigration does not aﬀect factor prices and individual skill should not be correlated with
immigration attitudes. If not, assuming that capital is internationally mobile, the correlation be-
tween immigration attitudes and individual skill should be related to the skill composition of natives
relative to immigrants in the destination country. If skilled and unskilled labor are complements,
skilled individuals should favor immigration if natives are more skilled than immigrants, since in
this case immigration reduces the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor and raises the skilled
wage. The opposite is true for countries where natives are less skilled than immigrants.
My ﬁrst set of empirical results is based on a restricted sample of countries, for which I can
use a direct measure of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. I ﬁnd that the
cross-country pattern in the correlation between skill and immigration attitudes is consistent with
the labor-market predictions of the factor-endowments models. Skilled individuals are more likely
to be pro-immigration in countries where the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants is
high. Based on the restricted sample of countries, I ﬁnd that per capita GDP and the relative skill
composition of natives to immigrants in the destination country are positively correlated, that is
rich countries are more likely to receive immigrants who are less skilled than natives and, viceversa,
for poor countries. Therefore I use per capita GDP of the destination country as an indirect measure
of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants, which allows me to broaden the analysis
to a more extended sample of countries. My results show that, the richer the host country is, the
more positive is the impact of schooling on favorable opinions about immigrants. Individual skill
is positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries and
negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries.
Overall, my ﬁndings are consistent with the labor-market predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, in the absence of factor-price-insensitivity, and of the factor-proportions-analysis model.
The robustness of the factor-endowments explanation is conﬁrmed by additional results based on
individual-level data on occupation. Individuals in occupations which experience a bigger increase
in relative supply due to immigration, that is with a higher ratio of immigrants to natives, are less
likely to be pro-immigration. In addition, my results on labor-market determinants don’t change
when I control for other economic explanations of immigration preferences.
Finally, I analyze correlation patterns between attitudes towards immigrants and individual an-
swers to questions on non-economic issues. The inclusion in the empirical model of these additional
regressors allows me to test the robustness of the empirical regularity previously observed. Non-
economic factors do not seem to alter signiﬁcantly the results on the economic explanations. After
controlling for how individuals feel about the impact of immigration on crime rates and on cultural
and national identity, and taking into account people’s racist attitudes and their feelings about
political refugees and illegal immigration, I still ﬁnd evidence of the same cross-country pattern, in
terms of the correlation between individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes.
Various papers have analyzed preferences on immigration policy but, in most cases, they have
been characterized by the use of indirect measures of people’s attitudes or by the focus on a single
2country, for example the United States and Great Britain.2 In addition, few empirical works have
related their results to the predictions of theoretical models. This paper combines three elements
of the previous literature: the use of a direct measure of individual immigration preferences, the
comparison of attitudes both within and across diﬀerent countries, and the interpretation of the
empirical results in terms of the predictions of theoretical models.
Indirect measures of policy opinions, such as those based on voting and lobbying, are imperfect
measures of preferences, because they are jointly determined by individual attitudes and the insti-
tutional structure of government (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, 2001c). In a cross-country work,
such as in this paper, this would be a serious shortcoming, since institutions are certainly diﬀerent
across nations.3 To get around this problem, I use two individual-level data sources: the 1995
National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme and the third wave of the
World Value Survey data set, carried out in 1995-1997. The ﬁrst source contains data on 22 coun-
tries, mostly developed economies, while the second data source gives information on 44 nations,
most of which are developing countries. Where possible, I test the robustness of the results using
both data sets. The cross-country dimension of the two surveys allows me to test for interactive
eﬀects between individual-level characteristics and country-level variables. The advantage of this
empirical strategy is that it makes it easier to overcome interpretational ambiguities that arise in
single-country studies (Citrin et al. 1997, Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, Scheve
and Slaughter 2001b, Dustmann and Preston 2001a, 2001b) or in multi-country analyses that do
not explore cross-country heterogeneity of coeﬃcients (Bauer et al. 2000, Brücker et al. 2001,
Chiswick and Hatton 2002, Gang et al. 2002).4
The empirical literature on immigration preferences reaches diﬀerent conclusions on the role
of economic factors relative to non-economic ones. For the United States, while Espenshade and
Hempstead (1996) ﬁnd mostly evidence in favor of non-economic explanations of preference pat-
terns, the results in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) and in Kessler (2001) highlight the importance of
economic determinants. Citrin et al. (1997) interpret their ﬁndings as providing weak evidence for
the role of personal economic circumstances in U.S. immigration preferences. Finally the analysis
in Dustmann and Preston (2001b) points out that, in Great Britain, economic determinants matter
for attitudes towards immigrants, but that racial prejudice is deﬁnitely the most important factor
in preference formation.
In this paper I ﬁnd evidence that both sets of factors, economic and non-economic ones, are
important. In a wide range of countries, attitudes towards immigrants appear to be related to
labor-market concerns, security and cultural considerations, as well as individual feelings towards
political refugees and illegal immigration. In particular my analysis reveals that, controlling for
2The empirical literature on individual immigration preferences includes works focusing on the United States
(Citrin et al. 1997, Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b) and on Great
Britain (Dustmann and Preston 2001a, 2001b) and papers with a cross-country perspective (Bauer et al. 2000,
Brücker et al. 2001, Chiswick and Hatton 2002, Gang et al. 2002, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003). The literature also
oﬀers historical accounts of the political economy of immigration restrictions at the turn of last century (Goldin 1994,
Timmer and Williamson 1996).
3That is, using indirect measures, the variation in outcomes may be due to diﬀerences in attitudes or in institutions.
4Since I began my work I have become aware of another related, but independent paper on individual immigration
attitudes (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003) which is the only other work besides mine to relate correlations at the
individual level to country characteristics.
3non-economic factors, the economic variables play a key and robust role in preference formation over
immigration policy. My results are consistent with the predictions of standard economic models
and reject a view of the world in which only non-economic considerations shape attitudes towards
foreigners.
From a methodological point of view, the paper most related to my work is Scheve and Slaughter
(2001b), who analyze individual preferences on immigration policy in the United States using the
1992 National Election Studies survey. The focus of their work is on determinants of immigration
preferences working through the labor market. As in my paper, Scheve and Slaughter use a direct
measure of individual opinions and closely relate the empirical analysis to the results of theoretical
models. The main diﬀerences between Scheve and Slaughter’s study and my paper is that I adopt
a cross-country perspective, which is richer in terms of theoretical predictions, and I focus on both
economic and non-economic determinants of immigration preferences. My paper is also related
to Scheve and Slaughter’s (2001c) work on trade opinions in the U.S. and to the cross-country
literature on individual preferences on trade policy (O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Mayda and
Rodrik (2005)).
To conclude, there are two main motivations behind the analysis of immigration attitudes. First,
individual-level opinions on immigration oﬀer indirect information about the distributional impact
of factor movements, as perceived by the public. Controlling for non-economic determinants, it is
possible to test whether these preferences are consistent with the eﬀect of immigration on individual
returns, as predicted by standard economic models. The main focus of this paper is on models that
explain preferences in terms of individuals’ and countries’ factor endowments, the Heckscher-Ohlin
trade model and the factor-proportions-analysis labor model. The value of this approach, based on
individual attitudes, is that it provides new ground for testing the income-distribution predictions
of theories of immigration.
Another reason why it is interesting to analyze immigration attitudes is that they are likely to be
a primary determinant of international migration ﬂows. Individual preferences shape the demand
side of immigration-policy decisions which are also aﬀected, on the supply side, by policymakers’
preferences and the institutional structure of government (Rodrik 1995). Immigration policies, in
turn, are likely to be a major factor explaining the recent evolution of labor movements. The size
of immigrant ﬂows depends on both the host country’s demand for immigrants (i.e., immigration
policies) and migrants’ decisions to move, according to political and economic incentives. Empirical
evidence suggests that the economic forces driving the supply side of international immigration —
cross-country wage and income diﬀerentials, reduced transport, communication and information
costs, opportunities for risk diversiﬁcation — have become stronger in the last decades. Restrictive
policies, then, most likely explain the relatively small scale of international immigration (Faini
2001).5
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets. Section 3 focuses
on economic explanations of attitudes, while Section 4 introduces non-economic determinants of
immigration preferences. In Section 5 I conclude.
5The comment on the small size of immigrant ﬂows is relative to the past (nineteenth century) and to other
globalization forces such as trade ﬂows.
42D a t a
This paper uses two individual-level survey data sets and aggregate data on international migration
and on destination and origin countries of immigrant ﬂows. The two survey data sets contain
information on the socio-economic background of each respondent and on his opinions on topics
such as immigration and trade policies, patriotism, and national identity. Therefore, the two surveys
allow me to identify both stated immigration preferences and individual characteristics that explain
such preferences in standard economic models.
The ﬁrst survey comes from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). I use the 1995
ISSP National Identity module (ISSP-NI) covering more than 20,000 respondents from 22 countries,
including the United States, Canada, Japan and several Western European countries. The survey
also includes a few Eastern European countries and one developing country, the Philippines.
I focus on survey answers to the question: “There are diﬀerent opinions about immigrants from
other countries living in (respondent’s country). (By “immigrants” we mean people who come
to settle in (respondent’s country).) Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s
country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as it is,
(d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot”.6 Besides the ﬁve ordered answers, the survey format
also allows for “can’t choose” (CC) and “not available” (NA) responses. I recode respondents’
answers (1=“reduced a lot”, to 5=“increased a lot”), and I call this variable Immig Opinion.I
also create a dichotomous variable, Pro Immig Dummy, equal to one for individuals who express
pro-immigration attitudes (i.e., for those replying “increased a little” or “increased a lot”).7
The ISSP-NI data set includes a host of other questions on immigration-related issues. I focus
on the question above as it is the most closely related to the theoretical predictions. However, in
various speciﬁcations, I use responses to other immigration questions as explanatory variables.
To control for each individual’s socio-economic background, I use information from ISSP-NI
questions on age, gender, parents’ foreign citizenship, years of education, area of residence (rural
vs urban), subjective social class, political aﬃliation with the right and trade union membership. I
also use each respondent’s individual real income as a basic indicator of individual economic status.8
A measure of individual skill is constructed from data on years of education and is used to test
the implications of the factor-endowments models. Survey answers on individuals’ occupation are
also employed, to test the robustness of the factor-endowments results. Responses on topics such
as national pride and identity, multiculturalism, illegal immigration and political refugees are used
to control for non-economic determinants of immigration policy preferences.9
The ISSP-NI data set mostly covers high and middle-income economies. I complement the
results from this source with the ﬁndings based on the third wave of the World Value Survey
(WVS), carried out in 1995-1997. The WVS data set includes more than 50,000 respondents from
44 mostly developing economies. The immigration question in the WVS asks the following: “How
6A similar question has been analyzed in most of the empirical literature on individual immigration preferences
(Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, Citrin et al. 1997, and Kessler 2001).
7I exclude non-nationals from the sample. CC and NA responses are coded as missing values for both variables.
Using Heckman selection model, I ﬁnd no evidence that omitting CC and NA responses results in a selection bias.
8Deﬁnitions of these variables are at the end of Table 1a.
9The details about the construction of these variables are given in a related paper on trade policy preferences
(Mayda and Rodrik 2005) and in the Tables and Appendix.
5about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think
the government should do? (a) Let anyone come who wants to? (b) Let people come as long as
there are jobs available? (c) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?
(d) Prohibit people coming here from other countries? (e) Don’t know.” I transformed answers to
the WVS immigration question into two dependent variables: an ordered variable, Immig Opinion
(WVS), and a dichotomous variable, Pro Immig Dummy (WVS), both constructed after excluding
“Don’t know” responses from the sample.10
Since ordered probit results are harder to summarize, I will present and discuss the results from
probit estimation using the dichotomous measure of immigration attitudes.11 The tables at the end
of the paper — based on either one of the two data sets — present the probit marginal eﬀects and
corresponding standard errors of each regressor, holding all other variables at their mean. All the
regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for additive country-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects,
and have standard errors adjusted for clustering on country.12
Individual-level information from both data sources is combined with additional data on immi-
gration ﬂows and stocks from the International Migration Statistics data set for OECD countries
(OECD 1997). Immigrants’ ﬂows numbers are based on the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System
on Migration (SOPEMI). Data on the origin and labor market characteristics of immigrants’ stocks
is based on survey and census data from Eurostat and national governments.
In particular, in this paper I use statistics on immigrant inﬂows into OECD countries in the
period 1990-1995; on native and immigrant populations by level of education in 199513;a n do n
native and immigrant populations by occupation in 1995, according to the 1988 International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO).14
Data on religious adherence in the host country and in the main origin countries of foreigners
comes from Barro and McCleary (2002), while statistics on language in the destination and source
countries of immigrants and on the colonial relationship between pairs of countries come from Glick
and Rose’s website.15 Finally, data on exchange rates, purchasing power parity conversion factors
and population come from the 2001 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, developed by the
10I exclude foreign-born individuals from the sample. I then recode respondents’ answers to construct the variable
Immig Opinion (WVS), which ranges from 1=“prohibit people coming here from other countries” to 4=“Let anyone
come who wants to”. Pro Immig Dummy (WVS) is deﬁned as follows: Pro Immig Dummy (WVS) =1, if Immig
Opinion (WVS)=3 or 4; 0, if Immig Opinion (WVS)=1 or 2. Based on Heckman selection model, I ﬁnd no evidence
of selection bias after omitting “Don’t Know” responses.
11Estimates of the ordered probit coeﬃcients, using either one of the two data sets, are consistent with the results
based on the dichotomous variable and are available upon request from the author. Similarly, my results don’t change
when I keep CC and NA responses in the ISSP-NI data set and "Don’t Know" responses in the WVS.
12Fixed-eﬀects estimation of a probit model may lead to inconsistent estimates (incidental parameter problem).
This is not an issue with the ISSP and WVS data sets as they are long panels (many individuals for each country).
13Education levels are coded according to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED): 1. less
than ﬁrst stage of 2nd level (ISCED 00, 01 and 02); 2. completed 2nd stage of 2nd level (ISCED 03 and 04); 3.
completed 3rd level (ISCED 05 and over); 4. other general education, not applicable and no answer. ISCED level 02
usually refers to a ninth grade education.
14Occupations by 1988 ISCO are classiﬁed as follows: 1. Armed forces; 2. Legislators and managers; 3. Profession-
als; 4. Technicians; 5. Clerks; 6. Service and sales workers; 7. Agricultural and ﬁshery workers; 8. Craft and related
trades workers; 9. Plant and machine operators; 10. Elementary occupations.
15Glick and Rose’s website is at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#Software
6World Bank. Tables in the Appendix contain country-level summary statistics of the main variables
used in the paper.
3 Economic Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Most likely, both economic and non-economic factors shape individual preferences over immigration
policy. Among the economic determinants, one of the most important is likely to be the impact of
immigrants on natives’ returns through factor markets. The main results of my analysis are related
to this determinant. By considering this aspect of preference formation, I investigate whether indi-
viduals reveal, through their attitudes, a self-interest maximizing or economically-rational behavior,
as assumed in the models of Section 3.1.
Another important economic factor shaping people’s stance is the perceived ﬁscal impact of
immigration on the welfare state. In some receiving countries immigrants are likely to belong to
the bottom of the income distribution, which makes them probable beneﬁciaries of costly welfare
programs. This in turn will aﬀect natives’ individual contributions to and beneﬁts from the welfare
state. My results shed light on this issue as well. Finally, the variation in attitudes towards
foreigners may also depend on diﬀerences in individual perceptions of the economy-wide beneﬁts
and costs of immigration. I test the robustness of the results based on economic self-interest in
factor markets to this alternative explanation.
Before narrowing the focus of the analysis, it is interesting to look at the most basic patterns
in the two surveys. Table 1a, based on the ISSP-NI data set, and Table 1b, based on the WVS
ﬁgures, present the results from a benchmark model of immigration attitudes, whose focus is on the
social, demographic and economic background of each respondent. As both sets of results show,
older people favor immigration restrictions, as do individuals living in more rural areas and in
smaller towns.16 More educated individuals and respondents with family ties to non-nationals are
more open to immigration. Males are more likely to be pro-immigration in the ISSP-NI data set:
this gender diﬀerence disappears using the WVS statistics.17 Aﬃliation with more conservative
political parties is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, in both sets of ﬁndings.
Using the ISSP-NI data set, individual (real) income, social class, and trade union membership
do not have a signiﬁcant impact on immigration preferences. On the other hand, relative income
positively aﬀects attitudes towards foreigners in the WVS sample of countries.
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the benchmark model, estimated with both the ISSP-NI and
the WVS data sets, is a signiﬁcant and positive impact of education on pro-immigration attitudes.
The variables used in Tables 1a and 1b as measures of schooling, years of education (in the ISSP-NI
data set) and educational attainment (in the WVS data set), are among the most often employed in
the labor and growth literatures as indicators of levels of skill. Thus, these initial results reveal that,
on average, in the sample of countries considered, there exists a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between individual skill and pro-immigration preferences. These average results hide cross-country
heterogeneity, as will become clear in the empirical analysis of Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
16The statistical signiﬁcance of these results changes across speciﬁcations.
17The gender eﬀect disappears using the ISSP-NI data set too, once I control for the immigrants-to-natives ratio
in the individual’s occupation (Table 3a).
73.1 Factor-Endowments Models of Immigration-Policy Attitudes
In this section I look at the predictions of two economic models - the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model
and the factor-proportions-analysis (FPA) model - as regards the impact of immigration on indi-
vidual utilities through factor markets. In terms of the distributional eﬀect of immigration, the
interaction between individual factor type and each country’s factor endowments plays a key role in
both the HO model and the FPA model. Hence, I will refer to both as factor-endowments models.
The HO model is one of the workhorse theories of international trade. It focuses on small open
economies, characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition in each sector. At
least two goods are assumed to be produced, so that trade can take place between countries. In
addition, factors are perfectly mobile across sectors.
T h ek e yf e a t u r eo ft h eH Om o d e li sd i ﬀerences across economies in relative factor endowments.
Through trade, each country either exports or imports the services of a factor of production ac-
cording to whether it is abundantly or poorly endowed with it, relative to the rest of the world.
The predictions of the HO model, with regard to the impact of immigration on factor rates of
return, depend on a key condition that relates the number of internationally-traded goods produced
in the country (n) to the number of primary factors of production (m). If n ≥ m, ceteris paribus
as u ﬃciently small increase of a factor’s supply does not have any eﬀect on factor rates of return:
factor-price-insensitivity holds.18 If the shock to the factor’s supply is substantial or if n<m ,
a change in a factor endowment aﬀects factor prices. Thus, in the HO model, the impact of
immigration on factors’ rates of return depends on the extent of diversiﬁcation of the country’s
production, in terms of internationally-traded goods, and on the size of the factor supply shock.
To gain intuition regarding these predictions, I present a simple model that suits the empirical
analysis in the paper: the 3 × 2 HO model with and without diversiﬁcation. The 3 × 2 HO model
encompasses both factor-endowments models since the labor-market predictions in the case without
diversiﬁcation (only one good produced) are the same as in the factor-proportions-analysis (FPA)
model described in Borjas (1999a).
Consider a small open economy with three factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital)
which produces two goods. Capital is assumed to be internationally mobile (r = r∗), so that dr =0 .
The native workforce has a fraction b of skilled workers and a fraction (1 − b) of unskilled workers
(N = b∗N+(1−b)∗N). The immigrant workforce has a fraction β of skilled workers and a fraction
(1 − β) of unskilled workers (M = β ∗ M +( 1− β) ∗ M). The total labor force is L = N + M.
Two sets of conditions hold in equilibrium on the production side, the production equilibrium
conditions — price is equal to unit cost for each good produced — and the set of factors’ full-
employment conditions:
pi = bi(wS,w U,r∗),i =1 ,2 (1)
Vj = y1b1j(·)+y2b2j(·),j = S,U,K (2)
where pi and yi,i=1 ,2 are respectively prices and quantities produced of each good and bi(·),i=
1,2 are sectors’ unit cost functions, characterized by partial derivatives with respect to each factor
price bij(·), j = S,U,K.19 VS = bN +βM, VU =( 1−b)N +(1−β)M and VK are respectively the
18I assume that no factor-intensity reversals occur.
19The partial derivatives bij(·) give the cost-minimizing requirement of input j to produce one unit of good i.
8total supply of skilled workers, unskilled workers and capital, and wS,w U and r∗ are respectively
the price of skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital.
If the country produces both goods and the immigration shock is suﬃciently small, factor
prices are insensitive to changes in factor endowments induced by immigration.20 The reason is
that factors’ rates of return are pinned down by system (1) in 2 equations and 2 unknowns. Unless
goods’ prices change in international markets or technology improves, factor prices do not change.
In this case, immigration-induced changes in factor supplies only aﬀe c ts y s t e m( 2 )a n da r ea b s o r b e d
through Rybczynski eﬀects, with reallocation of factors across sectors.
If the country only produces one good or if the immigration shock is big enough to change
which goods are produced, factors’ rates of return change due to immigration.21 In particular in
the former case, without diversiﬁcation, the labor-market predictions of the (open-economy) HO
model are the same as in the (closed-economy) FPA model, which has been widely used in the
labor-economics literature (Borjas 1999a, Borjas et al. 1996 and Borjas et al. 1997). In the FPA
model a single aggregate output market is assumed. In addition, as in the HO model, a national
labor market characterizes every factor of production, that is factors can move costlessly within
country borders.
The FPA model predicts that any immigration-induced change in the country’s relative supply
of skilled to unskilled labor has an impact on factor prices. Therefore what is crucial is the diﬀerence
between the fraction of skilled workers in, respectively, the native and the immigrant workforce.
The host country’s skilled wage is an increasing function of M if (b−β) > 0, a decreasing function of
M if (b−β) < 0, and is independent of M if (b−β)=0(Borjas 1999a).22 Intuitively, if (b−β) > 0,
immigrants are less skilled than natives: thus the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor
decreases with the inﬂow of foreigners and the skilled wage increases. If (b − β) < 0,s k i l l e dl a b o r
becomes relatively less scarce after immigration and the rate of return to skill decreases. Finally,
if (b − β)=0 , immigration-induced changes in factor supplies do not alter the skill composition of
the labor force in the destination country and the structure of factor returns stays the same.
Each individual l is either skilled or unskilled. His indirect utility function is given by vl(p1,p 2,y l),
where yl = wj + r · kl, j = S,U, represents income. If individuals care only about economic
self-interest, preferences on immigration policy are determined by the sign and magnitude of the
derivative dvl
dM. Given the assumption of small open economy and international mobility of capital,
immigration attitudes will only depend on immigration-induced changes in skilled and unskilled
wages.23 If production is diversiﬁed and the immigration shock is suﬃciently small, skilled and
20The case when both goods are produced is such that the number of primary factors of production (excluding
capital, which is internationally mobile) is no greater than the number of goods.
21The intuition about the ﬁrst condition is that, with only one equation in (1), the full-employment conditions are
now necessary to pin down factor prices. The intuition about the second condition is that the equations of system
(1) have now changed (some of them correspond to diﬀerent goods).
22In particular, the changes of the skilled and unskilled wage given an inﬂow of immigrants dM > 0 are respectively
















b(1−b),w h e r eαi is the share
of national income accruing to factor i and M =0at the beginning of the period. These formulas correspond to
Borjas’s (1999a) results in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. They assume that unskilled (skilled)
labor complements skilled (unskilled) labor and capital and substitutes with other unskilled (skilled) labor.
23The hypothesis of small open economy implies
dpi
dM =0 , i =1 ,2. I also assume that natives’ individual factor
endowments are not aﬀected by immigration.
9unskilled individuals should not diﬀer in their preferences, since factor-price-insensitivity holds
(dwS = dwU =0 ). The same prediction holds true if immigrants and natives have the same skill
composition. In any other situation, we should observe a skill cleavage in individual attitudes
towards immigrants: in countries characterized by high skill composition of natives relative to im-
migrants, skilled (unskilled) individuals should favor (oppose) immigration, while the opposite is
true in countries with low relative skill composition of natives to immigrants.
3.2 Empirical evidence based on a direct measure of the skill composition of
natives relative to immigrants
In the benchmark model of Tables 1a and 1b, I constrain the coeﬃcients on individual characteristics
to be equal for all countries in the samples. However, the impact of socio-economic and demographic
variables on immigration attitudes is likely to diﬀer across economies. I now take advantage of the
panel-data structure of the two surveys and investigate cross-country heterogeneity of coeﬃcients.
I ﬁnd that, while the eﬀect of most variables does not vary, the impact of individual skill diﬀers
considerably across countries (see footnote 34 below).
The empirical analysis is guided by the theoretical results of the previous section. Given the
assumptions of the model, I focus on two factors, skilled and unskilled labor and investigate whether
the eﬀect of individual skill on immigration attitudes takes place in labor markets. First, I empir-
ically test the predictions of the factor-endowments models using a direct measure of the relative
skill composition of natives to immigrants.24 It is hard to construct such a direct measure, due
to the scarcity of immigration data. For each receiving country, I need information on immigrants
and their skill level and, in comparable terms, the same statistics on natives. The OECD (1997)
International Migration Statistics (IMS-OECD) allow me to construct the relative skill composition
measure for fourteen countries, all developed economies.25 For each of these fourteen countries, the
IMS-OECD statistics give ﬁgures on native and immigrant populations by ISCED level of educa-
tion. However, only nine of these countries are included in the ISSP-NI data set (very few of them
a r ep r e s e n ti nt h eW V S ) .
Therefore the regressions in Table 2 are based on a smaller number of countries than in the full
ISSP sample. The impact of individual skill on immigration preferences is modeled as a function
of each country’s relative skill composition of natives to immigrants by including in the empirical
speciﬁcation both the direct eﬀect of individual skill and an interaction variable, education*relative
skill ratio.T h erelative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition of natives to
immigrants. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as
the ratio of the number of individuals with levels of education 2 and 3 to the number of individuals
with level 1 of education (see footnote 13). The data used to construct this variable is for the stock
of immigrants and natives in 1995 and comes from the IMS-OECD data (OECD 1997).26




(1−β)) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
in the native relative to the immigrant populations. The theoretical predictions in footnote 22 are in terms of the




(1−β) > 1 if and only if (b − β) > 0.
25See footnote at the end of Figure 1 for a list of the fourteen countries.
26Due to unavailability of data on the skill composition of the ﬂow of immigrants, I use the same type of information
for the stock of immigrants. In other words, I adopt the same assumption as in Borjas (1999a)’s model: the skill
10The results in columns (1) and (2) are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Section
3.1. They show that the relationship between the individual skill level and pro-immigration at-
titudes indeed depends on the relative skill ratio. Educated individuals are more likely to be
pro-immigration if the latter variable is above a given threshold.27 This result is consistent with
the model’s predictions since, the higher the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants,
the smaller the ex-post relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor in the destination economy,
and the higher (lower) the skilled (unskilled) wage. In addition, speciﬁcation (3) shows that the
cross-country skills-preferences pattern disappears once I restrict the sample to individuals out of
the labor force.28
The following two regressions test a more restrictive hypothesis. Based on the models of Section
3.1, if the skill composition of immigrants exactly mirrors the human capital endowment of the
native population (β = b), there should be no eﬀect of immigration on factor returns and, therefore,
on preferences. If instead natives are more (less) skilled than immigrants, the relative supply of
skill will be lower (higher) ex-post and real rates of return to skilled labor will be higher (lower). In
column (4), SN (skilled natives) is an indicator variable for whether the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor for natives is greater than for immigrants; SM (skilled immigrants) is an indicator for the
opposite situation.29 In other words, these two variables are constructed using the cut-oﬀ point
equal to one for the relative skill composition. In the estimates of column (4), as expected in
the theoretical models, the marginal eﬀects of the two interaction variables which include SN and
SM are respectively positive and negative.30 If natives are more skilled than immigrants (SN=1),
the impact of years of education is positive and bigger in magnitude the more diﬀerent the two
groups are in terms of skill composition. If immigrants are more skilled than natives (SM=1), then
(setting aside the direct eﬀect of individual skill) more educated individuals are less likely to be
pro-immigration, with the latter eﬀect becoming stronger as the disparity in skill ratios widens.
Finally, the marginal eﬀect of years of education by itself, positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
contradicts one of the predictions of the factor-endowments models. There should be no eﬀect of
immigration on wages and, therefore, on preferences if the skill compositions of immigrants and
natives are the same. It is possible that the result depends on the eﬀect of education working
through non-economic channels, as discussed below.
To summarize, for the sample of OECD countries on which Table 2 is based, the results are
supportive of the factor-endowments predictions. The correlation between immigration preferences
and individual skill is consistent with the immigration-induced change in the host country’s relative
supply of skilled to unskilled labor. In particular, the results for this group of developed countries
composition of immigrants is assumed not to change over time.
27Columns (1) and (2) assume that individuals across countries think of an increase in the number of immigrants
in equal percentage terms, relative to their country’s population (
dM
N ).
28I will discuss this test more at length in section 3.3, where it is run on a larger number of countries. In Table 2,
the out-of-the labor force subsample excludes housewifes (men) in home duties, as I ﬁnd that they behave as if they
were in the labor force. This is not surprising, given assortative matching of wives and husbands based on education.
29The countries with SN equal to 1 are: Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, France
(not in ISSP-NI), Denmark (not in ISSP-NI), Belgium (not in ISSP-NI), Finland (not in ISSP-NI). The countries
with SM=1 are: Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal (not in ISSP-NI).
30The two interaction variables are, respectively, education*SN*(RSC-1) and education*SM*(1-RSC),w h e r eRSC
is the relative skill composition.
11are in line with both the predictions of the HO model without factor-price-insensitivity and of the
FPA model. They are not consistent, however, with an HO model in which changes in factor
endowments do not trigger changes in factor prices and where only Rybczynski eﬀects occur.
3.3 Empirical evidence based on an indirect measure of the skill composition
of natives relative to immigrants
The results in Section 3.2 are based on a direct measure of the relative skill mix of natives to
immigrants for a restricted sample of countries. I next use an indirect measure - the (log) per
capita GDP of the destination country (gdp) - which allows me to broaden the analysis to the full
ISSP sample and to test the robustness of the results using the WVS.
Per capita GDP is thought to be a good proxy for a country’s human capital endowment.
However, according to the models in Section 3.1, the (ex-ante) skill composition of the destination
country’s labor force by itself does not pin down the sign of the relationship between individual
skill and preferences. Ceteris paribus, in countries with equal endowments of human capital, skilled
individuals may have diﬀerent attitudes towards immigrants, depending on the skill composition
of such foreign workers. In other words, it is the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants
which matters.
In a very simple one-sector model where countries share the same production function, economies
with higher ratios of skilled to unskilled labor (high per capita GDP countries) have lower rates
of return to skilled labor and higher rates of return to unskilled labor. The opposite is true for
countries with low values of the skill ratio (low per capita GDP countries). Labor ﬂows are driven
by diﬀerences in real rates of return to factors. Therefore, in this simple model, skilled labor tends
to move from high to low per capita GDP countries and, unskilled labor, in the opposite direction.
Based on such simplifying assumptions, it is possible to predict the skill composition of immigrants
(relative to natives as well), as a function of per capita income of the destination country.
However, taking into account cross-country diﬀerences in technology levels complicates the
theoretical predictions. In richer countries rates of return can be higher than in the rest of the
world for all factors, making it diﬃcult to guess the skill composition of the immigrant workforce.31
The link between per capita GDP and the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants is therefore
an empirical question. Based on the fourteen countries for which data is available, the simple
correlation between per capita GDP and the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is
equal to 0.6120 (signiﬁcant at the 1.53% level). A simple scatterplot of this correlation, in Figure
1, shows that it is not driven by outliers.
It is important to check that inferences are robust to the variable switch before broadening the
sample. Regression (6) in Table 2 replicates the results of column (1) for the restricted sample of
countries using per capita GDP rather than the skill-mix measure. In regression (7), which controls
for both interaction terms education*gdp and education*relative skill ratio, only the marginal eﬀect
on the latter variable is signiﬁcant. This suggests that per capita GDP is indeed capturing the
eﬀect of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants.
31Davis and Weinstein (2002) stress the same point when they notice that all factors (unskilled labor, skilled labor
and capital) are characterized by positive net inﬂows into the United States.
12My ﬁrst set of results using the full sample of countries is based on estimating separately probit
models for each economy. The country-speciﬁc regressions reveal a great deal of cross-country
variation in terms of the correlation between skill and attitudes. Figures 2a, 3a and 3b summarize
the evidence across countries. Figure 2a for the ISSP-NI sample presents the country-speciﬁc
marginal eﬀect of years of education on pro-immigration preferences (y axis) as a function of per
capita GDP of the destination economy (x axis).32 Figures 3a and 3b for the WVS data set are
similarly constructed.33 All three graphs show a positive relationship between per capita GDP of
the host economy and the size of the country-speciﬁc impact of individual skill on attitudes in favor
of foreigners.
I can gain additional insight on this pattern by, again, pooling all countries together in a single
regression. As before, I use per capita GDP as an indirect measure of the relative skill composition
of natives to immigrants. Speciﬁcally, I include in the model speciﬁcation both the direct eﬀect of
individual skill and an interaction variable, education*gdp, which is the product of the education
measure times each country’s (log) per capita GDP in 1995 (in international dollars). Column (1)
of Table 3a presents the marginal eﬀects of this speciﬁcation, estimated using the ISSP-NI data
set. I ﬁnd strong evidence of a reversal in the impact of the individual skill level on immigration
preferences. Individual skill appears to be positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences
in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in
low per capita GDP countries.34
In particular, the estimates for years of education (-0.0454, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) and
education*gdp (0.0054, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) imply that any country with per capita GDP
in 1995 (PPP-adjusted) lower than approximately $4480 is characterized by a negative correlation
between skill and pro-immigration preferences, while individuals from countries with per capita
GDP above this threshold are more likely to be in favor of immigration the more educated they
are. In Germany, for example, one more year of education increases the likelihood of being pro-
immigration by approximately one percentage point, while in the Philippines one more year of
education decreases the probability by 0.1 percentage points. These results are consistent with the
empirical regularity uncovered by the country-speciﬁc regressions and summarized in Figures 2a,
3a, 3b. In addition, I will show that these ﬁndings are very robust, using various speciﬁcations
and diﬀerent skill measures, in both the ISSP-NI and WVS samples (see Table 3a, based on the
ISSP-NI data set, and Table 3b, based on the WVS).
32I estimate a separate probit model for each country. In Figure 2a the y axis measures the country-speciﬁc
estimated marginal eﬀect of years of education on the probability of being pro-immigration, holding all other regressors
at their mean value. The regressors of each probit model are age, male, parents’ foreign citizenship, education, pro-
immig crime and pro-immig culture.
33I nb o t hF i g u r e s3 aa n d3 b ,t h eya x i sm e a s u r e st h ec o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc estimated marginal eﬀect of the highest
education level attained on the probability of being pro-immigration, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The regressors include age, male, country of birth, upper social class, political aﬃliation with the right, education.
The ﬁrst graph refers to the whole sample of countries, the second one only to countries with 1995 per capita GDP
(PPP) less than 15,000 international dollars.
34On the other hand, with the ISSP-NI data the correlation between immigration attitudes and, respectively, age,
gender, parents’ foreign citizenship, real income is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries, when I use per capita
GDP (in 1995, PPP-adjusted) as a summary measure of each country. Only the impact of political aﬃliation with
the right varies according to the level of national income.
13I ﬁrst question whether the coeﬃcient on schooling is really capturing the impact of individual
skill, i.e. whether the estimated eﬀect is working through the labor market. Both skill measures
(years of education and educational attainment) are likely to be correlated with individual char-
acteristics which have an impact on immigration preferences. Such omitted variables could bias
the estimates and drive the main result. To (partly) address this problem, in regressions (2)-(5) in
Table 3a I include additional controls, relative to the core speciﬁcation of column (1). In regression
(2), the inclusion of the variable political aﬃliation with the right does not considerably aﬀect the
main cross-country pattern. The likelihood of being pro-immigration still increases with education
in high per capita GDP countries, but it decreases with education if the destination economy is
poor.
This ﬁnding does not change after controlling for the (log of) individual real income in column
(3). The impact of the latter variable is not signiﬁcant and does not alter considerably the main
result. This rules out the possibility that the education measure is only picking up the eﬀect of
economic status. In addition, by controlling for total individual income, I can in part account
for ownership of other factors of production owned by the respondent, like capital.35 Ia l s oc h e c k
whether the non-linearity in the impact of education is driven by the reversal of the eﬀect of
individual income. I ﬁnd no evidence of this in regression (4), which shows that it is the impact of
education, and not of income, that is non-linear and signiﬁcant. Since individual contributions to
and beneﬁts from the welfare state are usually proportional to individual income, results in columns
(3) and (4) are also evidence against a welfare-story explanation of attitudes.
I further investigate the possibility that the eﬀect of education is working through channels
other than the labor market. In the ISSP-NI data set, I systematically test the robustness of the
results based on years of education by controlling for the following two regressors: pro-immig crime,
which represents the respondent’s perceived impact of immigration on crime rates and pro-immig
culture,w h i c hq u a n t i ﬁes the respondent’s perceived cultural eﬀect of immigration. Security issues
and cultural considerations are likely to be among the most important non-economic determinants
of preferences which are aﬀected by schooling. By comparing two individuals who feel the same
in terms of these issues, I hope to better isolate the economic channel, which links individual skill
to immigration preferences through the labor market. The results in regression (5), which controls
for pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture, still show the same pattern as in column (1): better
skilled individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration in richer countries, and less likely in poorer
countries.
To gain more evidence on whether the impact of schooling is indeed working through the labor
market, I next follow Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) in running two separate regressions, one for
the subsample of individuals who belong to the labor force and the other for those who do not.36 I
expect to see no eﬀect of education for individuals out of the labor force if the correlation between
schooling and preferences is in fact driven by labor-market causes.
The estimates in regressions (6)-(7) conﬁrm that the impact of education on immigration atti-
35The two data sets do not contain direct information on individual capital ownership.
36The labor force subsample includes individuals who are full-time employed, part-time employed, less than part-
time employed (main job); unemployed. The out-of-the labor force subsample includes individuals who are retired;
housewifes (men), in home duties; permanently disabled, sick; others, not in labour force, not working. I exclude
students from the sample since their number of years of education does not reﬂect their expected future skill.
14tudes is in fact related to the labor-market channel. Compared to the full sample (regression 5),
the preferences-skill pattern is more pronounced in the labor-force subsample and, on the other
hand, any correlation is absent (the estimates are considerably smaller and not signiﬁcant) in the
group of individuals out of the labor force.
In Figure 2b, I use data from the ISSP-NI data set and I draw regression lines as in Figures
2a, 3a and 3b. The regression lines in Figure 2b refer to the two subsamples of individuals who,
respectively, are and are not in the labor force. In particular, after dividing the sample into the
two groups, I separately estimate the country-speciﬁc marginal eﬀect of years of education on pro-
immigration preferences for the subsample of individuals who are in the labor force and, next, for
the subsample of individuals outside the labor force. Each line in Figure 2b gives the ﬁtted values
of the regression of these marginal eﬀects on per capita GDP in 1995. Figure 2b clearly shows that
the correlation between the impact of skill on attitudes and the country’s level of per capita income
disappears for individuals outside the labor force. This is another piece of evidence in favor of the
labor-market interpretation of the cross-country pattern.37
In column (8), in place of years of education, I employ a diﬀerent indicator of skill, skilISCO,
which is constructed with individual occupation data based on the 1988 ISCO classiﬁcation.38
skilISCO exploits the skill information provided by such classiﬁcation. It is a particularly good-
quality indicator of individual skill since, in addition to formal schooling, it captures the role of
on-the-job training and of the nature of the work (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). Using skilISCO and
its interaction with each country’s (log) per capita GDP in 1995, I ﬁnd evidence of the same pattern
as before. The empirical regularity is also robust to excluding from the sample the only developing
country in the ISSP-NI data set (the Philippines) in column (9) and to dropping observations from
low-income countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Philippines, Latvia) in column (10). Finally, my
estimates do not change considerably (not shown) when I control for pro-immig economy,w h i c h
measures the impact of immigration on the country’s economy, as perceived by the individual.
Economy-wide beneﬁts and costs of immigration appear to be important, but they do not drive the
results on individual skill.
The results from Table 3b, which are based on the WVS ﬁgures, conﬁrm the strength of the
main result found with the ISSP-NI data set. I use survey questions to construct four diﬀerent
measures of individual skill: the highest education level attained by the individual, the age at which
the respondent has completed education, and two skill measures based, respectively, on occupation
data for the individual and for the chief-wage-earner in the household. Using any of the four
indicators of skill, the impact of education on immigration preferences once again is positive for
high-income countries and negative for low-income countries. In addition the cross-country pattern
in skill cleavages once again disappears for individuals out of the labor force. Hence, Table 3b
suggests that the previous estimates are not driven by the particular sample of countries there
37The dependent variable of the regressions in Figures 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b is a generated regressand. I therefore use
robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. I obtain very similar estimates if I use weighted least squares,
with weights equal to the inverse of the standard errors of the estimated country-speciﬁc marginal eﬀects.
38The idea to construct this measure using the ILO’s 1988 ISCO coding scheme comes from O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2001), who use the same ISSP-NI data set in their analysis of trade policy preferences. Each 1988 ISCO occupation
is matched with one of four skill levels, which are deﬁned according to the level of education and to the extent of
informal training and experience required to perform a job.
15considered. Indeed, the WVS data set mostly includes developing countries and thus complements
the ISSP-NI sample.
To summarize, the results based on per capita GDP are consistent with what I found using
a direct measure of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. They conﬁrm a role
for labor-market determinants of immigration preferences along the lines of the factor-endowments
models. For the sample of countries analyzed in the previous section, the evidence is consistent
with the predictions of the HO model without factor-price-insensitivity and of the FPA model.
For all the other countries, mostly middle and low-income economies, the interpretation of the
skill-attitudes pattern based on per capita GDP depends on whether there is any immigration at
all to such destinations and, if so, which type of immigration in terms of skill composition. It is
plausible to extend the interpretation based on the HO model without factor-price-insensitivity and
on the FPA model to countries with sizeable immigration intakes. On the other hand, in countries
characterized by small immigration numbers, the factor-price-insensitivity result may hold.39
If there is indeed immigration to middle and low-income countries, the next step is to investigate
which type of immigration, whether skilled or not. The positive correlation with per capita GDP
suggests that the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants would be lower for poorer
destination countries. Only if this is true, is the negative relationship between pro-immigration
preferences and individual skill in lower-income countries consistent with the predictions of the
factor-endowments models.
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on size and skill composition of immigration to developing
countries is now very scarce. Very few sources in the literature document the extent of immigration
to these destinations.40 One of them, the International Labor Migration Database (ILO 1998),
shows that immigrants’ ﬂows to lower-income destinations exist and are sometimes substantial
in magnitude (however, this data cannot be used, due to the low degree of harmonization across
countries). As for the skill composition of immigration to developing countries, preliminary evidence
suggests that it might be consistent with the results of this paper.41 Future empirical work on this
point should focus on the worldwide increase in short-term mobility of highly-skilled workers, due to
the reduction in international business travel and communication costs (Tang and Wood 2000), and
on medium and long-term ﬂows of skilled labor linked to FDI into low per capita GDP countries.
39The factor-price-insensitivity interpretation may apply to those countries whose marginal eﬀect of skill is esti-
mated to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Unfortunately, these are also the countries for which reliable data
on immigration ﬂo w si sn o ta v a i l a b l e .
40These sources include: Jenks (1992), SOPEMI (1997), OECD (2000), Freeman (1995).
41SOPEMI (1997) documents the following: “Several developing South-East Asian countries have emerged as both
sending and receiving countries for skilled and unskilled workers....China, which is experiencing shortages of highly
skilled labour and which is now receiving important inﬂows of foreign direct investment, counted roughly 80,000
foreign workers in 1995, one third of whom were from Japan, 20 per cent from the United States and 13 per cent
from Germany.” (p.48). According to the same source, Central and Eastern European countries - such as Bulgaria,
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and the former Soviet Union - have become in the nineties a new
destination of immigration ﬂows. Remember also that what matters in the model is the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants and that the average skill level of natives in lower-income countries is generally low.
163.4 Empirical Evidence based on Individual-level Data on Occupation
I use individual-level data on occupation to further test the robustness of the factor-endowments
explanation (regressions (11) and (12), Table 3a). Speciﬁcally, I match each individual with the
number of immigrants relative to natives in his occupation and I interpret each occupation as a
diﬀerent factor of production. I can then use the predictions of the multi-factor version (m>n )
of the factor-endowments models. If an occupation has a higher ratio of immigrants to natives
than average it means that, due to immigration, it has experienced a bigger increase in supply
relative to other occupations. Therefore, according to a factor-endowment story, individuals in
s u c ho c c u p a t i o n sw i l lb el e s sl i k e l yt ob ep r o - i m m i g ration. In this framework, skilled and unskilled
labor are considered as many diﬀerent factors as the number of occupations in which they are
employed.
In particular, in regression (11) I look at the relationship between immigration preferences and
the immigrants-to-natives ratio of the individual’s occupation (IN ratio), including among the re-
gressors the usual socio-economic controls (age, male, parents’ foreign citizenship, education). I ﬁnd
that, in occupations characterized by higher fractions of foreigners relative to natives, individuals
are more likely to be anti-immigration. The marginal eﬀect of the IN ratio is negative and signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level.42 I also compare the two versions of the factor-endowments models (regression
(12)). This allows me to investigate which time horizon - short-run or long-run or both - is most
important for individuals when they assess immigration policy. The multi-factor version provides
a short-run view of the labor market since it assumes that individuals on average are not able to
move from one occupation to the other. Therefore immigrants only aﬀect the real rates of return
of the occupations they take up and, therefore, the preferences of individuals working in the same
activity. On the other hand, the 3 × 2 factor-endowments models are based on a long-run view of
the economy, since skilled and unskilled labor are supposed to be free to move across occupations
and equalize real rates of return. I ﬁnd that the most relevant time horizon is a long-run one,
in which the perceived eﬀect of labor inﬂows is on national labor markets of skilled and unskilled
labor.
4 Non-Economic Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Up to now, the analysis has focused on economic determinants of immigration policy attitudes. I
next investigate correlation patterns between attitudes towards immigrants and individual answers
to questions about non-economic issues. The inclusion in the empirical model of these regressors
allows me to test the robustness of the economic results.
Both security worries and cultural and national-identity issues are key non-economic factors
aﬀecting immigration opinions (see pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture in column (5)-(7),
Table 3a). Security concerns are related to the perception that immigrants are more likely than
natives to be involved in criminal activity. An interesting question is whether this belief is linked
to an objective situation — due for example to a negative selection of immigrants to some countries,
driven by the type of immigration policy — or whether it is due to racist and intolerant feelings,
42The result in regression (11) is robust to adding two additional controls, Immig Crime and Immig Culture.
17although I cannot distinguish these causes in the data.
Cultural and national-identity issues are related to the intrinsic side eﬀect of immigration: the
meeting, which often becomes a clash, of people of diﬀerent ethnic origins and cultures.43 The
integration of immigrants in the destination society may be perceived as a source of enrichment on
both sides. On the other hand, immigration may feed cultural and national-identity worries, driven
by the belief that the set of values and traditions that characterize the receiving country’s society
are threatened by the arrival of foreigners. At the extreme, this type of concerns may just be the
consequence of the dislike of anything which is diﬀerent, that is, cultural and racial intolerance.
A few survey questions in the ISSP-NI data set, combined with external data on origin and des-
tination countries of immigrants, allow me to further investigate the role of cultural and national-
identity issues. I investigate two dimensions: ﬁrst, the individual preference for a culturally ho-
mogenous society, which I call monoculturalism, as opposed to a multicultural community, labeled
multiculturalism; second, whether immigrants adapt successfully in the destination country’s soci-
ety or not. The latter is a function of how much immigrants and natives are culturally diﬀerent. I
use information on the ﬁve main countries of origin of foreigners for each host country to construct
measures of cultural dissimilarity between natives and immigrants.
As expected, I ﬁnd that individuals with a taste for multiculturalism are more likely to be pro-
immigration, while the opposite is true for respondents with a preference for a more homogeneous
society, in terms of customs and traditions (column (1), Table 4). I next investigate how these two
variables — monoculturalism and multiculturalism — interact with the degree of cultural diﬀerence
b e t w e e nn a t i v e sa n di m m i g r a n t s .Il o o ka td i ﬀerences based on the main language spoken and on
religious aﬃliation in the origin and destination countries and I explore the role of past colonial
relationships. The only signiﬁc a n tr e s u l t so ft h i sa n a l y s i sr e l a t et od i s s i m i l a r i t i e si nr e l i g i o u sa ﬃl-
iation and are presented in regression (2), which contains the interaction terms between religious
diﬀerence and, respectively, monoculturalism and multiculturalism.44 I ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect
of monoculturalism does not change with religious diﬀerence. On the other hand, individuals with
a taste for a multicultural society are negatively aﬀected in their immigration opinion by bigger
dissimilarities between natives and immigrants in religious terms.
The variables in column (3) also give information on cultural and national-identity issues. In
particular, national pride (2) and national pride (3), which are negatively and signiﬁcantly related
to pro-immigration attitudes, quantify the extent of individual attachment to the nation, the latter
indicator in a stronger form than the former one. The results from regression (3) are consistent
with the intuition that individuals who feel closer to their country’s identity are more likely to be
anti-immigration.45 Column (4) in Table 1b, based on the WVS data set, reveals the same pattern:
More patriotic and nationalistic individuals are less likely to be in favor of immigration.
I next look at the relationship between immigration preferences and individual feelings about
43“In Adam’s Smith’s words ‘man is of all sorts of luggage the most diﬃcult to be transported.’” (Chiswick and
Hatton 2002, p.1)
44The variable religious diﬀerence, which measures the dissimilarity between natives and immigrants in terms of










¯ ¯,w h e r eD and
O are for destination and origin country and pr represents the fraction of the population in religion r.
45This conﬁrms one of the main results in Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) about the link between immigration
preferences and isolationist feelings.
18illegal immigration and political refugees (regression (4), Table 4). Both variables have the expected
sign and are highly signiﬁcant. Individuals who are against illegal immigration and who do not
welcome political refugees are also more likely to oppose an increase in immigration. On the other
hand, the same regression suggests that whether an individual belongs to the dominant ethnic
group in society does not have a signiﬁcant impact on opinions about foreigners.
Finally, in the last column of Table 4, I put together all the main factors shaping immigration
attitudes into a single speciﬁcation. By combining both sets of variables, economic and non-
economic ones, I can investigate how robust my previous ﬁndings are. The picture of individual
preferences that emerges from this ﬁnal set of results is multi-faceted. Both economic and non-
economic indicators appear to be important. But, in particular, regression (5) shows that the
cross-country pattern in the correlation between preferences and skill — which is evidence of labor-
market determinants — is still present when I control for the non-economic variables. This result
remains robust when I use the WVS data set.
As mentioned before, intolerance on the basis of race may explain a lot of the variation in
immigration preferences and may be the driving force behind other types of explanations. The
WVS data set includes a question that allows me to construct a measure of racist feelings. Using
such measure, I ﬁnd that racism is indeed highly correlated with anti-immigration feelings. A
respondent who would rather not have as neighbors individuals of a diﬀe r e n tr a c ei sm o r et h a n
eight percentage points less likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration. However, the cross-
country pattern in the correlation between skill and preferences is almost unaﬀected by the inclusion
of the racism variable. Labor-market based explanations survive this robustness test (results not
shown).
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper I ﬁnd evidence that both economic and non-economic factors are important in ex-
plaining immigration attitudes. In a wide range of countries, attitudes towards immigrants appear
to be related to labor-market concerns, security and cultural considerations, as well as individual
feelings towards political refugees and illegal immigration. In particular, my analysis shows that
the labor-market variables continue to play a key and robust role in preference formation over
immigration policy, after controlling for non-economic factors. My results, therefore, reject a view
of the world in which only non-economic issues shape attitudes towards foreigners.
In particular, I ﬁnd that opinions about immigration policy are signiﬁcantly correlated with
individual skill and that there exists substantial cross-country variation in terms of this correlation.
The evidence in this paper is consistent with a labor-market interpretation of the skills-preference
pattern across countries. My ﬁrst set of results is based on a restricted sample of countries, due
to data limitations. The cross-country variation in the correlation between skill and preferences
appears to be related to diﬀerences in the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants across
destination economies. Skilled individuals are more( l e s s )l i k e l yt ob ep r o - i m m i g r a t i o ni nc o u n t r i e s
where the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is high (low). I next use an indirect
measure of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants, per capita GDP, which allows
me to look at a broader sample of countries. I ﬁnd that individual skill is positively correlated with
19pro-immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with pro-
immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries. This result is robust to various changes
in the empirical speciﬁcation and to the use of two diﬀerent data sources. Overall my results are
consistent with the labor-market predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, without factor-price-
insensitivity, and of the factor-proportions-analysis model. In addition, individual-level data on
occupation provides more evidence in favor of the factor-endowment interpretation. Individuals
in occupations with a higher ratio of immigrants to natives appear to be more likely to oppose
immigration.
Non-economic variables also are found to be signiﬁcantly correlated with immigration policy
preferences. Both concerns regarding the impact of immigration on crime rates and individual
perceptions of the cultural eﬀect of foreigners are found to covary with immigration attitudes. In
addition, racist feelings have a very strong, negative and signiﬁcant impact on pro-immigration
preferences. However, these non-economic determinants do not seem to alter signiﬁcantly the
results regarding the economic variables. Labor-market explanations of attitudes towards foreigners
survive, after taking into account these non-economic factors.
To conclude the analysis on individual immigration attitudes, I investigate the relative impor-
tance of economic considerations relative to non-economic ones, based on the speciﬁcation of the
model which includes all the main variables. I estimate a linear (OLS) regression using the ﬁve-
valued Immig Opinion as the dependent variable. I start with a speciﬁcation which only includes
the non-economic regressors (age, male, parents’ foreign citizenship, monoculturalism, multicultur-
alism, national pride (2), against illegal immigrants, in favor of political refugees, pro-immig crime,
plus dummy variables). I next add the economic variables (education, education*gdp, log of real
income, pro-immig economy). The diﬀerence between the two R2 measures (0.3946-0.3339=0.0607)
is the fraction of the total variance which is explained by economic factors, after accounting for
the contribution of non-economic determinants. If I repeat the same exercise including ﬁrst the
economic variables plus dummy variables, and next the non-economic regressors, the R2 increases
by 0.1538. Therefore, while this paper rejects a view of the world where only non-economic factors
aﬀect immigration preferences, it also ﬁnds that non-economic determinants are relatively more
important than the economic variables considered, in terms of variance explained.
Finally, I look into what accounts for diﬀerences in average attitudes across countries.46 Let’s
consider, for example, Canada and Hungary which, in terms of attitudes towards foreigners, are at
the opposite extremes (see Appendix 1), with the former country much more open to immigration
than the latter one. According to my model, some 17 percent of the diﬀerence between Canadians
and Hungarians in terms of pro-immigration preferences is explained by the dissimilarity in the
impact of individual skill (i.e., the combination of the diﬀerence in both average individual skill
in each country and the country-speciﬁc marginal eﬀect of skill), approximately 22 percent by the
diﬀerence in the individual perception of the economy-wide beneﬁts of immigration, around 4 per-
cent by the diﬀerence in the percentages of individuals having parents with foreign citizenship, 8
percent by stronger feelings against illegal immigrants in Hungary relative to Canada and, ﬁnally,
more than 7 percent by less sympathetic feelings towards political refugees in Hungary than in
46This decomposition of the diﬀerence in average immigration attitudes across countries is based on a linear (OLS)
speciﬁcation using the ﬁve-valued Immig Opinion as the dependent variable. The regressors are the same as in the
analysis of the relative importance of economic versus non-economic variables.
20Canada. To conclude, approximately 14 percent of the diﬀerence is due to dissimilar perceptions
of the link between immigration and crime rates (see Appendix 1). The rest is mostly explained
by country dummy variables which account for around a quarter of the diﬀerence in average immi-
gration attitudes between the two countries. Country ﬁxed eﬀects play an important role in terms
of total variance explained by the model as well. The analysis below focuses on country dummy
variables to further explain cross-country variation in average immigration attitudes.
Country-level variables, such as per capita GDP and the size of the immigrant inﬂow, cannot
be included additively in the individual-level regressions together with country ﬁxed eﬀects (due to
perfect multicollinearity).47 Country dummy variables are necessary as, without them, coeﬃcients
on individual variables would be inconsistent due to unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects. I use a two-
step procedure to get around these problems. In the ﬁrst stage, I estimate a linear speciﬁcation
with Immig Opinion as the dependent variable and, as regressors, the main economic and non-
economic individual-level variables plus country ﬁxed eﬀects.48 I next regress the coeﬃcients of
country dummy variables on country-level characteristics. In the second stage, given that the
dependent variable is a generated regressand, I use weighted least squares (WLS) with weights
equal to the inverse of the standard errors of the country-speciﬁc intercepts from the ﬁrst stage
(Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003). This empirical strategy assigns more weight to countries with smaller
variance of the country ﬁxed eﬀect. My results are based on a restricted sample, for which data
is available. I ﬁnd that higher per-capita-GDP countries are on average less open to immigration,
after accounting for the impact of individual-level variables. This result is not surprising given
that, based on additional regressions, richer countries tend to have higher immigrant inﬂows and
less skilled immigrants relative to natives; and countries with higher immigrant inﬂows and lower
skill composition of immigrants relative to natives tend to be less pro-immigration on average.
Finally, the size of inﬂows of asylum seekers too is associated with more negative average attitudes
towards immigrants.
To conclude, immigration has become a central theme of political discussions in many countries.
This paper has shed light on the economic and non-economic impact of immigration as perceived by
individuals. Individual attitudes are necessarily a key input in policy outcomes and their viability.
Therefore this work contributes to a better understanding of immigration-policy decisions and, as
a consequence, of international migration ﬂows.
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The coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 0.0002393, signiﬁcant at 1% (robust standard error: 0.0000567).
The fourteen countries analyzed in this Figure are those with available data on the skill composition
of natives relative to immigrants: Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands,
Sweden, Canada, Spain, Portugal, France, Denmark, Belgium, Finland.
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The coeﬃcient of the line is 3.02e-07, signiﬁcant at 5% (robust standard error: 1.15e-07).
See also footnote 32.
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not in LF: the coeﬃcient of the line is 2.82e-08, insigniﬁcant (robust standard error=1.25e-07);
in LF: the coeﬃcient of the line is 4.36e-07, signiﬁcant at 5% (robust standard error=1.73e-07).
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This graph covers the whole sample of countries in the WVS. See also footnote 33.
The coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 1.68e-06, signiﬁcant at 1% (robust standard error=2.97e-07).
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This graph covers lower-income countries in the WVS. See also footnote 33.
The coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted line is 2.87e-06, signiﬁcant at 1% (robust standard error=6.76e-07).
27Probit with country dummy variables 1234Probit with country dummy variables 1234
Dependent variable Dependent variable
age -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002 age -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0015
0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004**
male 0.0122 0.0098 0.0086 0.0136 male 0.009 0.0059 0.0044 0.0111
0.0035** 0.0042* 0.0049 0.0052** 0.0069 0.0076 0.0081 0.0088
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0237 0.0248 0.0249 0.0349 upper social class 0.012 0.0107 0.0057 0.0039
0.0049** 0.0056** 0.0073** 0.0082** 0.0054* 0.0062 0.0068 0.0067
education (years of education) 0.006 0.0075 0.0064 0.0074 political affiliation with the right -0.0085 -0.0078 -0.0084 -0.0065
0.0011** 0.0012** 0.0017** 0.0015** 0.0027** 0.0028** 0.0027** 0.0028*
log of real income 0.0015 education (educational attainment) 0.0192 0.0176 0.0165 0.0152
0.0038 0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0041** 0.0041**
political affiliation with the right -0.0113 -0.0165 town size 0.0051 0.006 0.006
0.0055* 0.0091 0.0031 0.0030* 0.0032
rural -0.009 relative income 0.0048 0.0058
0.0038* 0.0024* 0.0025*
upper social class 0.0025 national pride (1) -0.0203
0.0038 0.0081*
trade union member 0.0002 national pride (2) -0.03
0.0059 0.0108**
number of obs 21581 15001 8171 8420 number of obs 36514 30829 26552 23243
Pseudo R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.08 Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Pro Immig Dummy
Table 1a: Benchmark Model (ISSP-NI data set)
political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: 1=far left, 2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right. rural is coded as follows: 
1=urban, 2=suburbs/city-town, 3=rural. upper social class is coded as follows: 1=lower, 2=working, 3=lower middle, 4=middle, 5=upper
middle, 6=upper. trade union member equals one if the individual is a member of a trade union, zero if he is not.
Table 1b:  Benchmark Model (WVS data set)
Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)
education (the highest education level attained by the individual) is coded as follows: 1=no formal education; 
2=incomplete primary school; 3=complete primary school; 4=incomplete secondary school (technical/vocational 
type); 5=complete secondary school (technical/vocational type); 6=incomplete secondary (university/preparatory 
type); 7=complete secondary (university/preparatory type); 8=some university-level education, without degree; 
9=university-level education, with degree.
upper social class  is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 
5=upper class. political affiliation with the right is coded as follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). 
town size is coded as follows: in order, from 1=under 2,000 to 8=500,000 and more. relative income  is coded as 
follows: from 1=lowest decile in the country to 10=highest decile in the country.  national pride (1) is coded as 
follows:1=not at all proud to be (Italian, for example); 4=very proud to be (Italian, for example).  national pride (2) is 
coded as follows: 1=if willing to fight in a war for one's own country; 0=if not willing.
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the 
value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering
on country are presented under each marginal effect. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample excludes all 
individuals who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table contains 
the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevan
regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country are 
presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded).  parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both 
parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.  log of real income  is calculated using data in local 
currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing power parity conversion factors from the WDI (World 
Bank).
2 R 2 R
R R
R R
2 R 2 R
2 R 2 RProbit with country dummy variables 1234567
out of labor 
force
Dependent variable
age -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005
0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0002**
male 0.0078 0.0107 0.0089 0.0078 0.0106 0.0087 0.0078
0.005 0.0043* 0.0059 0.0049 0.0042* 0.0052 0.0049
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0163 0.01 -0.003 0.0163 0.01 0.0165 0.0163
0.0052** 0.0046* 0.0043 0.0052** 0.0046* 0.0054** 0.0053**
education (years of education) -0.0012 -0.002 -0.0008 0.0066 0.0035 -0.2191 -0.0245
0.0012 0.0010* 0.001 0.0015** 0.0012** 0.0716** 0.0701
education*relative skill ratio 0.0099 0.0074 0.0022 0.0093







pro-immig crime 0.0491 0.0286 0.0489
0.0064** 0.0042** 0.0064**
pro-immig culture 0.0489 0.032 0.0487
0.0084** 0.0068** 0.0083**
number of obs 10414 10414 2085 10414 10414 10414 10414
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.13
The out-of labor force subsample includes individuals who are retired; permanently disabled, sick; others, not in labour force, not working. 
Pro Immig Dummy
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-
immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country are 
presented under each marginal effect. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
parents' foreign citizenship  is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens. The  relative skill ratio  is the log of 
one plus the relative skill composition (RSC). The RSC is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with levels of education 2 and 3  to the number of individuals with level 1 of education 
(see footnote *).  In order to get the semi-elasticity with respect to the RSC, one needs to multiply coefficients' estimates of the relative skill ratio by RSC/(1+RSC).  The RSC uses 
data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995.  SN is an indicator variable of whether the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations 
is greater than 1; SM is an indicator variable of the same ratio being less than 1. See Appendix 1 for the definition of  pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture.
Table 2: Factor-Endowments Model: Empirical evidence based on a direct measure of the skill composition of 
natives relative to immigrants (ISSP-NI data set)
The regressions are based on the following countries: Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Spain. These are the countries in the ISSP-NI 
sample for which direct data on the RSC is available.
2 R 2 RProbit with country dummy variables 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
in labor force








age -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005
0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0004 0.0004
male 0.0118 0.0095 0.0093 0.0093 0.0118 0.0089 0.0131 0.0101 0.0119 0.0107 -0.0019 -0.0029
0.0035** 0.0046* 0.0044* 0.0044* 0.0029** 0.0042* 0.0035** 0.0038** 0.0036** 0.0041** 0.0132 0.0133
parents' foreign citizenship 0.023 0.0252 0.0242 0.0242 0.0157 0.0186 0.0096 0.0277 0.0224 0.023 0.0207 0.0194
0.0049** 0.0060** 0.0055** 0.0055** 0.0043** 0.0056** 0.0042* 0.0043** 0.0048** 0.0050** 0.0097* 0.0089*
education (years of education) -0.0454 -0.0496 -0.0703 -0.0765 -0.0345 -0.0411 -0.0067 -0.0561 -0.1002 0.0085 -0.3472
0.0098** 0.0215* 0.0244** 0.0250** 0.0077** 0.0102** 0.0042 0.0172** 0.0420* 0.0022** 0.1017**
education*gdp 0.0054 0.0058 0.0079 0.0086 0.004 0.0048 0.0008 0.0064 0.0108 0.0362
0.0011** 0.0023** 0.0025** 0.0026** 0.0008** 0.0011** 0.0005 0.0018** 0.0043* 0.0102**
political affiliation with the right -0.015
0.0058**
log of real income 0.002 0.0821
0.0038 0.0739
log of real income*gdp -0.0082
0.0076
pro-immig crime 0.0472 0.0519 0.0266
0.0078** 0.0092** 0.0072**






Immigrants/Natives ratio in occupation -0.2705 -0.1432
(IN ratio) 0.0606** 0.0895
number of obs 21581 12507 15001 15001 21581 13237 7264 12999 20487 17717 3421 3421
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14
Table 3a: Empirical evidence based on a indirect measure of the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants (ISSP-NI data set)
Pro Immig Dummy
Regressions (11)-(12) are based on Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Ireland and Spain, for which there is data on individual occupation and on the immigrants-to-natives ratio by individual occupation.
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase 
in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country are presented under each marginal effect. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
Regressions (6)-(7): The labor-force  subsample includes individuals who are full-time employed, part-time employed, less than part-time employed (main job); unemployed.  The out-of labor force  subsample 
includes individuals who are retired; housewifes (men), in home duties; permanently disabled, sick; others, not in labour force, not working. I exclude students from the sample since their number of years of 
education does not reflect their expected future skill.
parents' foreign citizenship  is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens. political affiliation with the right  is coded as follows: 1=far left, 
2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right.  gdp  is the log of per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars). log of real income  is calculated using data in local currency on individual income from 
the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing power parity conversion factors from the WDI (World Bank). See Appendix 1 for the definition of pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture . skilISCO equals one if the 1988 
ISCO occupation code is 2 (legislators and managers), 3 (professionals) and 4 (technicians); it equals zero if the 1988 ISCO occupation code is 5 (clerks), 6 (service and sales workers), 7 (agricultural and fishery 
workers), 8 (craft and related trades workers), 9 (plant and machine operators) and 10 (elementary occupations). The IN ratio  is equal to the log of one plus the ratio in 1995 of the number of foreigners to the 
number of natives in the individual's occupation (the data for immigrants and natives is for to the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995). Data on immigrants' and natives' occupations follows the 1988 ISCO cla










age -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0023
0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0007* 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0004**
male 0.0089 0.009 -0.0156 -0.0055 0.0059 0.003 0.0114
0.0069 0.0096 0.0134 0.01 0.0069 0.0078 0.01
upper social class 0.0134 0.0155 0.0165 0.0164 0.0232 0.0154 0.0267
0.0051** 0.0060* 0.0076* 0.0089 0.0061** 0.0057** 0.0079**
political affiliation with the right -0.0082 -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0073 -0.0087
0.0028** 0.0031** 0.0039* 0.008 0.0031** 0.0034* 0.0035*
education (educational attainment) -0.1163 -0.154 -0.0443 -0.1764
0.0172** 0.0125** 0.0384 0.0280**
education*gdp 0.0157 0.02 0.0073 0.0217
0.0020** 0.0015** 0.0044 0.0031**
education age -0.023








(chief wage earner's occupation-based skill) 0.0191
cwe skill*gdp 0.0048
0.0023*
number of obs 33371 21047 8262 9966 29918 26371 14256
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)
The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their 
mean value. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country are presented under each marginal effect.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample excludes all individuals 
who were not born in the country where they are interviewed.
upper social class  is coded as follows: 1=lower class, 2=working class; 3=lower middle class; 4=upper middle class; 5=upper class. political affiliation with the right is coded as 
follows: in order, from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). See footnote at the end of Table 1b for the definition of  education. education age is the age at which the individual finished 
school. individual skill is coded as follows: 1=agricultural worker; 2=farmer (own farm); 3=unskilled manual worker; 4=semi-skilled manual worker; 5=skilled manual worker; 
6=foreman and supervisor; 7=non manual-office worker (non-supervisory); 8=supervisory-office worker; 9=professional worker (lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc.); 
10=employer/manager of establishment with less than 10 employees; 11=employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees.  cwe (chief wage earner in the household) skill 
is coded in the same way as individual skill.
Table 3b: Empirical evidence based on a indirect measure of the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants 
(WVS data set)
2 R 2 R
2 R 2 RProbit with country dummy variables 12345
Dependent variable
age -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001*
male 0.0126 0.012 0.0117 0.0112 0.0107
0.0033** 0.0066 0.0042** 0.0027** 0.0027**
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0238 0.0204 0.0218 0.0143 0.015
0.0049** 0.0046** 0.0053** 0.0023** 0.0021**
education (years of education) 0.0052 0.0079 0.0053 0.0022 -0.0251
0.0008** 0.0011** 0.0009** 0.0004** 0.0127*
education*gdp 0.0027
0.0013*
monoculturalism -0.0133 -0.0567 0.0011
0.0062* 0.0254* 0.0028






national pride (1) -0.0022
0.0037
national pride (2) -0.011 -0.0054
0.0019** 0.0017**
national pride (3) -0.0061
0.0025*
national pride (4) -0.0046
0.0024
against illegal immigrants -0.0191 -0.0179
0.0017** 0.0015**
in favor of political refugees 0.0194 0.0168
0.0016** 0.0018**
major ethnic group -0.0026
0.0059
number of obs 21581 9667 18975 12419 14473
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.22
The variable against illegal immigrants is higher (from 1 to 5) the more the respondent agrees with the following statement: "(R's country) should take stronger 
measures to exclude illegal immigrants." The variable  in favor of political refugees  is higher (from 1 to 5) the more the respondent agrees with the statement that 
refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in (R's country). The variable major ethnic group equals 1 if the 
respondent belongs to the dominant ethnic group in his country; it equals 0 otherwise. The four variables  national pride (1)-(4) measure the emphasis with which an 
individual declares respectively: (1) "feeling close to own country"; (2) "rather be citizen of own country"; (3) "own country better than others"; (4) "in favor of 
country's interests at any cost". See Mayda and Rodrik (2005) for summary statistics of  national pride (1)-(4) and details about their construction.
Pro Immig Dummy
Table 4:  Non-Economic Determinants Model (ISSP-NI data set)
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The table contains the estimated marginal effect on the probability 
of being pro-immigration, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.  Standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on country are presented under each marginal effect. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   parents' foreign citizenship is coded as follows: 1=both 
parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
The variable multiculturalism (monoculturalism) is an indicator variable of answer 1 (2) to the following question: "Some people say that it is better for a country if 
different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which 
of these views comes closer to your own? 1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions; 2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into 
the larger society." For each destination country, religious difference measures the dissimilarity between natives and immigrants, in terms of religious affiliation. 
Regression (2) is based on the following countries: Germany, Great Britain, United States, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Japan.
2 R 2 RGermany West 1225 47 10.909 0.536 - 0.378 1.743 20 0.028 18 0.207 10 0.618 5 0.336 6
Germany East 612 48 10.950 0.503 - 0.799 1.662 21 0.020 20 0.132 18 0.500 10 0.292 9
Great Britain 1035 47 11.321 0.403 - 0.216 1.942 16 0.041 14 0.363 6 0.509 9 0.152 16
USA 1310 45 13.426 0.430 1.596 0.162 2.092 12 0.081 9 0.332 7 0.566 6 0.292 10
Austria 991 47 10.355 0.453 - 0.462 2.187 8 0.039 15 0.182 13 0.429 15 0.393 4
Hungary 992 48 10.491 0.427 1.969 0.148 1.591 23 0.015 22 0.098 22 0.179 23 0.078 23
Italy 1092 43 11.028 0.483 1.982 0.338 1.850 17 0.036 16 0.207 9 0.428 16 0.212 13
Ireland 981 46 12.249 0.489 2.015 0.263 2.928 1 0.191 2 0.678 1 0.743 3 0.551 2
Netherlands 2059 44 12.685 0.454 1.724 0.215 2.164 9 0.055 13 0.322 8 0.562 7 0.151 17
Norway 1490 43 12.663 0.499 2.097 0.484 2.138 10 0.074 10 0.100 21 0.466 13 0.111 20
Sweden 1234 45 11.411 0.495 1.241 0.729 2.009 14 0.067 11 0.149 16 0.646 4 0.227 12
Czech Republic 1107 43 12.911 0.508 1.648 0.330 1.842 18 0.024 19 0.150 15 0.207 21 0.079 22
Slovenia 1036 43 10.677 0.440 2.031 0.380 2.061 13 0.019 21 0.206 11 0.271 17 0.189 14
Poland 1597 47 10.287 0.447 1.724 0.148 2.111 11 0.086 6 0.115 20 0.440 14 0.304 7
Bulgaria 1105 49 - 0.476 1.916 0.193 1.781 19 0.059 12 0.062 23 0.248 18 0.127 18
Russia 1580 45 11.187 0.449 1.505 0.619 2.281 5 0.083 8 0.172 14 0.245 19 0.159 15
New Zealand 989 46 14.310 0.473 1.498 0.212 2.226 6 0.116 4 0.387 5 0.749 2 0.468 3
Canada 1487 42 14.761 0.486 1.157 0.333 2.666 2 0.206 1 0.527 2 0.773 1 0.605 1
Philippines 1194 40 9.393 0.502 1.747 0.019 2.203 7 0.115 5 0.482 4 0.486 11 0.297 8
Japan 1256 46 11.868 0.458 - 0.308 2.609 3 0.157 3 0.146 17 0.467 12 0.363 5
Spain 1220 45 10.127 0.476 1.480 0.084 2.596 4 0.084 7 0.500 3 0.552 8 0.245 11
Latvia 768 46 11.611 0.389 1.938 0.197 1.638 22 0.004 23 0.199 12 0.215 20 0.126 19
Slovak Republic 1383 41 11.836 0.484 - 0.322 1.996 15 0.030 17 0.124 19 0.189 22 0.087 21
 Mean  44.809 11.675 0.468 1.703 0.313 2.128 0.074 0.255 0.462 0.251
Standard Deviation 16.913 3.572 0.499 0.898 0.464 1.007 0.262 0.436 0.499 0.434
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.  The second column of last 5 variables gives the ranking of countries according to that variable. Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values.
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded).  Rural is coded as follows: 1 urban, 2 suburbs/city-town, 3 rural. Trade Union Member is coded as follows: 1 member, 0 non member (i.e., missing values are excluded).
pro-immig crime=1 if Immig Crime Opinion=4 or 5; 0 otherwise. pro-immig culture=1 if Immig Culture Opinion=4 or 5; 0 otherwise. pro-immig economy=1 if Immig Economy Opinion =4 or 5; 0 otherwise.
Immig Crime Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?  Immigrants increase crime rates.  (1=agree strongly; 5=disagree strongly)
Immig Culture Opinion gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?  Immigrants make (R's country) more open to new ideas and cultures (disagree strongly=1;agree strongly=5).
Immig Economy Opinion  gives responses to the following question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?  Immigrants are generally good for (R's country's) economy (disagree strongly=1;agree strongly=5)
pro-immig 
culture
Immigr make the 
country more open 



















Appendix 1: Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables and for Individual Attitudes on Immigration (ISSP-NI data set)
Immig Opinion gives responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...": reduced a lot (1), reduced a little (2), remain the same as it is (3), increased a little (4), increased a lot (5). In the definition of  Immig 







The number of 
immigrants should 
be increased
Immigrants do not 
increase crime rates
Immigrants 
generally good for 
economy
Immig OpinionNigeria 824.990 6.715
Bangladesh 1280.880 7.155
Philippines 0.249 Ghana 1709.830 7.444
Puerto Rico 0.283 Pakistan 1765.360 7.476
Macedonia 0.322 India 1871.220 7.534
S.Africa 0.339 Armenia 1938.330 7.570
USA 0.346 Azerbaijan 1982.220 7.592
Taiwan 0.350 Georgia 2016.160 7.609
India 0.353 Moldova 2403.020 7.784
Finland 0.392 China 2681.390 7.894
Germany East 0.403 Philippines 3633.240 8.198
Sweden 0.406 Ukraine 3811.710 8.246
Turkey 0.407 Macedonia 4299.560 8.366
Venezuela 0.425 Dominican Republic 4350.740 8.378
Lithuania 0.438 Peru 4419.710 8.394
China 0.440 Latvia 5037.370 8.525
Estonia 0.452 Belarus 5217.670 8.560
Norway 0.458 Lithuania 5626.700 8.635
Latvia 0.466 Bulgaria 5679.510 8.645
Peru 0.475 Croatia 5905.530 8.684
Dominican Republic 0.492 Turkey 5924.610 8.687
Japan 0.497 Colombia 6012.530 8.702
Montenegro 0.514 Venezuela 6019.300 8.703
Australia 0.533 Romania 6543.390 8.786
S.Korea 0.539 Estonia 6558.690 8.789
Russia 0.539 Brazil 6726.440 8.814
Moldova 0.540 Poland 6794.980 8.824
Nigeria 0.541 Russia 7206.220 8.883
Switzerland 0.567 Mexico 7221.970 8.885
Bulgaria 0.572 Chile 7733.390 8.953
Argentina 0.587 Uruguay 8017.480 8.989
Serbia 0.599 S.Africa 8631.180 9.063
Mexico 0.602 Slovakia 8667.670 9.067
Slovenia 0.604 Hungary 9577.070 9.167
Chile 0.612 Argentina 10940.100 9.300
Croatia 0.614 Czech Republic 12414.290 9.427
Brazil 0.615 Slovenia 13191.210 9.487
Georgia 0.666 S.Korea 13758.830 9.529
Uruguay 0.687 Portugal 13774.940 9.531
Belarus 0.705 Spain 15412.220 9.643
Germany West 0.710 Ireland 17844.910 9.789
Spain 0.716 Finland 19204.450 9.863
Armenia 0.723 Britain 19880.390 9.897
Ukraine 0.734 Sweden 20449.570 9.926
Bosnia 0.759 Italy 20888.240 9.947
Azerbaijan 0.781 France 21065.020 9.955
total mean 0.533 Netherlands 21087.570 9.956











a. Let anyone come who wants to; b. Let people come as long as there are jobs 
available; c. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here; d. 
Prohibit people coming here from other countries. 
The immigration-related question asks: "How about people from other countries 
coming here to work.  Which one of the following do you think the government 
should do?
Immig Opinion Dummy (WVS) equals 1 if the individual answered a. or b. to the 
immigration-related question, 0 if c. or d.; "Don't Knows" are missing values.
country Pro Immig Dummy (WVS)
Appendix 2: World Value Survey Summary 
Statistics of Immigration Policy Preferences
Appendix 3: Per capita GDP of the countries in the ISSP and WVS 
samples
country
per capita GDP in 1995 
(PPP-adjusted)
log of per capita GDP in 
1995 (PPP-adjusted)